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ABSTRACT 
NASA and its industry and international partners 
are embarking on a bold and inspiring 
development effort to design and build an 
exploration class space system. The space 
system is made up of the Orion system, the 
Space Launch System (SLS) and the Ground 
Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) 
system. All are highly coupled together and 
dependent on each other for the combined safety 
of the space system. A key area of system safety 
focus needs to be in the ground and flight 
application software system (GFAS). In the 
development, certification and operations of 
GFAS, there are a series of safety characteristics 
that define the approach to ensure mission 
success. This paper will explore and examine the 
safety characteristics of the GFAS development. 
The GFAS system integrates the flight software 
packages of the Orion and SLS with the ground 
systems and launch countdown sequencers 
through the ‘agile’ software development 
process. A unique approach is needed to develop 
the GFAS project capabilities within this agile 
process. NASA has defined the software 
development process through a set of standards. 
The standards were written during the infancy of 
the so-called industry ‘agile development’ 
movement and must be tailored to adapt to the 
highly integrated environment of human 
exploration systems. Safety of the space systems 
and the eventual crew on board is paramount 
during the preparation of the exploration flight 
systems. A series of software safety 
characteristics have been incorporated into the 
development and certification efforts to ensure 
readiness for use and compatibility with the 
space systems. 
Three underlining factors in the exploration 
architecture require the GFAS system to be 
unique in its approach to ensure safety for the 
space systems, both the flight as well as the 
ground systems. The first are the missions 
themselves, which are exploration in nature, and 
go far beyond the comfort of low Earth orbit 
operations. The second is the current exploration 
system will launch only one mission per year 
even less during its developmental phases. 
Finally, the third is the partnered approach 
through the use of many different prime 
contractors, including commercial and 
international partners, to design and build the 
exploration systems. These three factors make 
the challenges to meet the mission preparations 
and the safety expectations extremely difficult to 
implement. 
As NASA leads a team of partners in the 
exploration beyond earth’s influence, it is a 
safety imperative that the application software 
used to test, checkout, prepare and launch the 
exploration systems put safety of the hardware 
and mission first. Software safety characteristics 
are built into the design and development 
process to enable the human rated systems to 
begin their missions safely and successfully. 
Exploration missions beyond Earth are 
inherently risky, however, with solid safety 
approaches in both hardware and software, the 
boldness of these missions can be realized for all 
on the home planet. 
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EXPLORATION SYSTEMS STRUCTURE 
NASA's Exploration Systems Development is 
building the agency’s crew vehicle, next 
generation rocket, and ground systems and 
operations to enable human exploration 
throughout deep space — a capability the world 
has not had for more than 40 years. 
 
The Orion spacecraft, Space Launch System 
(SLS) and a modernized Kennedy Space Center 
spaceport will support missions to multiple deep 
space destinations extending beyond our Moon, 
to Mars and across our solar system. This 
innovative approach aligns with NASA’s bold 
new mission to design and build the capability to 
extend human existence to deep space.  
 
A program at the Johnson Space Center manages 
the Orion, a program at the Marshal Space Flight 
Center manages the SLS and a program at 
Kennedy Space Center manages the Ground 
Systems Development and Operations (GSDO). 
The GSDO program is broken down into major 
projects under the program.  Command, Control 
and Communications (C3) is one of those 
projects.  The Ground and Flight Application 
Software, GFAS, is a project within GSDO. 
EXPLORATION MISSIONS 
Human exploration missions are in the critical 
development phases.  All three programs under 
ESD have completed their various Critical 
Design Reviews (CDRs).  Each of the CDRs is at 
different levels of maturity with the details of 
their designs.  In order to be ready for human 
flight in the 2021 timeframe a series of two 
highly integrated flights, test flights prior to a 
human test flight are required.  The first flight 
test was the Exploration Flight Test -1 (EFT-1) 
in December 2014. The Orion capsule was 
launched on a Delta 4 V launch vehicle.  The 
goal was to test the capsule structure as well as 
re-entry thermal and guidance. The second flight 
test is Exploration Mission – 1, (EM-1). This 
first fully integrated mission of NASA’s Orion 
spacecraft and Space Launch System (SLS) will 
launch from a modernized Kennedy spaceport. 
The 70-ton SLS will send an uncrewed Orion 
into lunar distant retrograde orbit, a large orbit 
around the moon that is farther into space than 
any human spaceflight system has ever ventured. 
The mission will last 25 days and splashdown in 
the Pacific Ocean.  Exploration mission – 2 
(EM-2) will be the first “crewed mission” of 
Orion launched from Kennedy spaceport again 
using the Space Launch System. The flight will 
focus on checking out the mission systems, crew 
systems, and demonstrating the capability for the 
crew to operate this vehicle in deep space, near 
the moon, and return safely to earth.  The 
mission is planned to be two weeks in duration.  
After the EM-2 flight, the integrated systems will 
be used to perform all of the future human 
exploration missions beyond Earth.  Destinations 
and complexity will evolve as the missions are 
defined and developed.  The entire architecture is 
based on capability not only on destination. 
GROUND AND FLIGHT APPLICATION 
SOFTWARE 
The overall construct of the C3 project includes 
the Launch Control System (LCS) as well as the 
GFAS system.  The LCS comprises a software 
and hardware platform structure and includes a 
set of system software that operates and 
interfaces with each of the flight vehicles, as well 
as the various ground systems’ interfaces, and 
the Launch Control Center (LCC).  Consoles 
within the LCC Firing Room are used by both 
the flight vehicle and ground system engineers to 
monitor and command the hardware, perform the 
testing, checkout, and preparations including 
launch countdown of the flight vehicles.  Each of 
the flight hardware vehicles has its own avionics 
and flight software that must interface with the 
LCS.  The Orion spacecraft, the SLS Core 
vehicle and the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion 
Stage (ICPS) all have different approaches to 
their corresponding flight avionics systems and 
flight software.  LCS must interface with each of 
these three different interface approaches as well 
as integrate the downlinked information and 
command uplink information all through a 
common set of equipment for the various Firing 
Room engineers.  The LCS platform system 
software is similar to various operating systems, 
like Windows or Apple OS operating systems.     
As with most command and control architecture, 
there needs to be applications on top of the 
platform of software structure.  The GFAS 
system is the equivalent command and control 
applications on those various operating systems.  
The GFAS applications integrate the flight 
software packages of the Orion, the flight 
software of the SLS, and the ground control 
systems through the LCS.  The launch 
countdown sequencers are also in the GFAS 
applications.  All GFAS applications use the 
‘agile’ software development process.   
 
Figure 1 – GFAS Application Structure  
The GFAS will develop the integrated firing 
room console applications and displays for pre 
and post launch activities to support flight and 
ground processing and integrated ground 
subsystem processing as required for Orion, 
Core Stage, Booster and ICPS. These software 
applications and displays will support integrated 
Ground Systems verification and validation, 
launch vehicle and spacecraft integration and 
launch processing. These displays and 
applications will also support off-line processing, 
recovery, and de-servicing of the Orion after 
splashdown. 
The applications and displays include Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) and applications for 
Command Control Sequences, Prerequisite 
Logic, Reactive Control Logic, and Data Fusion. 
 
Figure 2 – GFAS Application Types 
The GFAS software is used to satisfy integrated 
subsystem requirements, integrated ground to 
flight requirements, and integrated flight 
processing requirements.  The GFAS team is 
made up of ten grouped subsystems comprising 
of approximately 70 software and processing 
engineers.  Each subsystem team supports all the 
applications for the subsystem regardless of 
which flight vehicle they are supporting.  For 
example, Avionics team supports the avionics 
installed in Orion, ICPS, SLS, Boosters and 
Engines.  Below is the listing of each of the 
GFAS Teams. 
Avionics	  
Cryo/Prop	  
Electrical	  
ECLSS/Hypers	  
Flt	  Controls	  
Mech	  
APU/HYD	  
Comm	  
Integration	  
Master	  
Figure 3 – GFAS Software Teams 
The LCS system is developed through a series of 
Agile processes as well and is required to 
support Ground system verification and 
validation in late summer of 2016.  The GFAS 
subsystems are expected to have verifications 
completed prior to first use of any applications 
used in flight hardware processing and testing.  
The first critical milestone for this effort is 
currently expected in Fall of 2017 against the 
Orion vehicle in the Multi-Purpose Processing 
Facility (MPPF).  The Orion vehicle will go 
through a series of commodity loading activities 
and initial vehicle tests, prior to integration of 
the spacecraft hardware with the SLS in the 
Vertical Assembly Building (VAB). 
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
The GFAS project uses a form of “agile 
development” like many software application 
projects.  Agile development is an alternative to 
classic project management techniques, in that it 
adapts quickly to unpredictable and multi-
faceted requirement, design, verification and 
production situations.  Agile is an alternative to a 
standard “waterfall” or traditional sequential 
project development scheme.  For software 
applications, ‘agile develop’ is ideal when the 
vehicle hardware and interface hardware is still 
in design and development.  Otherwise a classic 
project approach would require software 
applications to be developed after the hardware 
design is matured, qualified and even in 
production, thus causing an extensive and 
lengthy overall program development schedule.  
In the case of the ESD development, without 
agile development to many of the various 
software products, at least two or more years 
would be added to the overall program 
development, as the tasks would be sequential 
instead of paralleled.  The Agile project 
development approach provides opportunity to 
assess and evaluate the direction of a project 
throughout the development lifecycle and adjust 
development priorities to match the assessment.  
This saves time during development.  To achieve 
this project effort, work is accomplished via a 
series of cadences called ‘sprints’.  For GFAS, a 
series of ‘sprints’ are made up into a Drop.  Each 
Drop has a specific set of actionable products to 
produce.  Each ‘sprint’ within a Drop is two 
weeks in duration, with a total of six ‘sprints’ per 
twelve-week Drop.  Thus the development can 
be measured in short increments. Changes, 
alterations, and issues that arise can be discussed 
and implemented within a Drop, and even from 
‘sprint’ to ‘sprint’.  There are a total of fourteen 
Drops for the overall GFAS project 
development.  In the Spring of 2016, GFAS will 
complete Drop 6 and start Drop 7. Additional 
Drops of requirement content, and software 
development activities can be added, if needed, 
due to flight hardware design modifications 
occur, or issues are found with ground or flight 
qualification activities.  This approach allows the 
focus on safety and preparing the correct design 
for each mission. 
 
The GFAS project control is through two 
separate activities.  As with any project there are 
the three pillars of project management, cost, 
schedule and technical project management.  The 
Technical Review Panel (TRP) is used to support 
the technical aspects of the GFAS project.  The 
TRP, baselines or modifies software design 
requirements and implementation methods to 
include verification and validation.  The TRP is 
the gateway between the driving NASA 
standards, specifications, and the flight/ground 
hardware design solutions and requirements.  
The TRP meets at least weekly to codify and 
accept the various GFAS team’s detailed 
development plans.  The second portion of the 
project control is the GFAS Drop Reviews.  
These Drop Reviews evaluate progress against 
the near term plan established for each twelve 
week Drop.  Progress is measured in schedule 
performance, and work effort against the 
expectations for that Drop.  The Drop Reviews, 
completed at the beginning, mid-point and end of 
each Drop help establish the cost and schedule 
impacts to the overall GFAS project effort.  
 
The figure below illustrates the Agile process 
used within the GFAS project. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – GFAST Agile Process 
The application software design lifecycle is 
made up of six phases for each set of the ten 
application’s teams.  These lifecycles are broken 
down by subsystem for the teams processing site 
locations which require an application software 
set of deliverables.  For example, the electrical 
applications used during the MPPF processing 
may be totally different than those used during 
the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB) 
processing.  The six phases include the Doc 45 
Design Review, the Doc 90 Design Review, 
Implementation, Integration, Verification and 
finally Validation.  Release of the application 
products for production use occurs after each of 
the lifecycle phases is completed for the software 
required for the site deliverable.  During any 
specific ‘sprint’ or Drop, different subsystems 
may have various application products in the 
different phases.  Therefore, not every 
application is at the same state of development 
and it’s that flexibility that makes the overall 
software development approach ‘agile’. 
Doc 45 Software Design Review 
The preliminary design development is 
commonly called the Doc 45 Design Review.  
This is the initial development of the 
requirements for the applications for specific 
subsystems.  Since during this phase, many of 
the flight hardware design states are unknown or 
still not mature enough in their designs, the 
content for the Doc 45 Design Review is 
considered preliminary.  At this phase the 
Software Requirements and Design 
Specifications (SRDS) are started.  The SDRS 
will address the scope of the software 
applications, the types of applications, either 
Displays, Sequencers and/or Algorithms.  In 
addition, the SRDS includes the approximate 
number of measurements and commands the 
applications are expected to process, the 
operational scenarios for the applications and 
any interface requirements to other applications 
will be documented along with the LCS platform 
needs or the flight hardware software interfaces.  
Each SRDS is brought forward to the TRP for 
approval. 
Doc 90 Software Design Review 
At the Doc 90 Design Review the software 
design package is ready for final review and the 
start of implementation.  At this point the flight 
hardware requirements are established, through 
the Operational Maintenance Requirements Set 
(OMRS), the Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), 
software standards and specifications and the 
flight hardware subsystem critical design.  A 
mapping of the software applications against 
each of the established requirements is 
completed and the resulting product is called the 
Requirements Traceability Verification Matrix 
(RTVM).  The RTVM is critical to establish the 
proper links between the flight hardware 
requirements, the safety specifications, and the 
detail software applications and code for 
implementation.  The RTVM is used throughout 
the rest of the software lifecycle including 
Verification and Validation.   From the RTVM, a 
set of Design Verification Objectives and Design 
Validation Objectives (DVO’s and DVaO’s) are 
produced and baseline for use during verification 
and validation phases. The software Doc 90 
Design package is accepted by the TRP as well 
as by the independent technical authorities as a 
check and balance of the software design.   
Implementation 
Implementation is the next phase in the software 
development process.  Implementation is the 
actual display development and software coding 
of the applications, scripts, sequencers and 
control logic.  For GFAS, the applications are 
coded in a C++ based Application Control 
Language (ACL). During this phase the 
applications are put under configuration control.  
Individual applications or components of an 
application are tested for syntax errors, logic 
gates, logic interfaces and also for its 
compatibility to the RTVM.  In order to remain 
as agile as possible, a certain amount of 
implementation can be worked in parallel with 
the Doc 45 and Doc 90 design effort.  This is 
necessary in the GFAS development lifecycle, as 
the flight hardware design and development is 
not often at a state for the ground software 
applications to proceed with fully accepted 
design details.  This approach is done at risk both 
to the schedule but more importantly to the 
technical content of the software requirements 
and actual code.  The TRP process and the 
GFAS project management pays particular close 
attention to the risk of performing this type of 
agile development effort.  Once the 
implementation phase is near completion, there 
is a re-alignment of the software applications to 
the RTVM and the corresponding DVO’s and 
DVaO’s.  This is critical in the extremely agile 
environment of the GFAS project to ensure all 
the requirements for usability are met, and safety 
remains as a focus for implementation at each 
step of the lifecycle.  
Integration 
The Integration phase provides the initial 
integration of the individual software 
applications to be compiled into a configuration 
managed Test Configuration Identifier 
Description (TCID).  The complied action is the 
first time the application is incorporated into the 
LCS platform.   Integration testing includes 
checks to assure that the applications have the 
appropriate measurement identifier information, 
and can properly communicate with other 
portions of the LCS systems. Any regression 
testing due to changes in the LCS platform 
operating system could also be performed during 
this phase against the application.  The DVO’s 
and DVaO’s are incorporated into a set of 
software verification test procedures.  A review 
and alignment of the SRDS, the RTVM, the 
application, and the verification procedures are 
completed by the TRP and accepted for readiness 
to begin the next step of the lifecycle, 
verification.  
Verification 
The Software Verification phase contains the 
verification activities needed to provide software 
requirements buyoff from quality and safety for 
the GFAS Displays and Applications. This 
testing is performed to ensure that all allocated 
functional requirements, including DVOs, are 
adequately and correctly satisfied.  A Software 
Test Readiness Review (STRR) is conducted 
early in the phase to ensure the GFAS software 
team and the project stakeholders are all 
cognizant of the test plans, procedures and 
schedule to complete the appropriate testing.  
Verification Test execution is performed by a 
member of the GFAS team that was not directly 
involved in the development of the software.  
This provides a level of independent verification.  
In addition, the Safety and Mission Assurance 
personnel buy-off the test procedure steps, as 
well as the closeout of the procedure.  A formal 
non-conformance process is also in place during 
the testing.  Any non-conformance is formally 
documented and appropriate corrective action is 
put in place before the GFAS application set is 
considered complete through the verification test 
process. 
Validation 
The Validation phase is the final phase prior to 
formal release of the software applications to the 
operational TCID set.  Once the verification 
testing is completed, and any non-conformances 
are formally disposition, the applications are 
ready for validation testing.  Like verification 
testing, most validation testing is performed 
against a set of software models built by a 
separate software organization.  The models are 
developed to simulate the flight hardware 
configurations.  Most are not full physics based 
models, but are adequate to verify the application 
software.  For validation testing, the stakeholder 
must accept the software for their use.  In the 
case of processing for Orion, ICPS and SLS, the 
stakeholders are the operations and processing 
engineers and test controllers who will be 
performing the various checkout tests and 
processing on the flight hardware.  In order to 
help ensure stakeholder needs were fully 
incorporated into the GFAS applications, the 
GFAST project appointed the GFAS “leads” 
from the operations engineering community at 
KSC.  So the validation testing will include 
members of the GFAS teams as well as other 
operations engineers.  A few of the validation 
tests will also be performed against the flight 
hardware test rigs at the hardware integration test 
rigs in Denver and Huntsville.  Validation testing 
is executed in a similar manner to the 
verification testing with complete configuration 
control, S&MA oversight and non-conformance 
processing.  Once the Validation testing is 
complete, the GFAS Application set is ready to 
use in an operational TCID and ready for a flight 
hardware Test Readiness Review (TRR).   
SOFTWARE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
Software projects under NASA’s control are 
subject to the NASA Standard NPR 7150.2B.  
This Standard addresses the various top-level 
standards for software development, safety and 
configuration management.  Individual software 
projects derive lower level software requirements 
and standards from the set of standards found in 
the NPR.  Under the GFAS project there are a 
number of additional standards, which must be 
followed for proper development.  They include 
the End To End Command and Control Software 
Development Plan, as well as the GSDO End To 
End Command and Control System and Software 
Safety Plan, and End-to-End Command and 
Control Software Assurance Plan.  Each of these 
is a lower level derived from the NPR 7150.2B. 
There are a number of software safety 
characteristics built into the GFAS system.  
Throughout the six phases of the project 
development, software safety characteristics are 
embedded into the phases.  Each of these 
characteristics adds a critical safety element in 
the overall structure of the GFAS software 
applications.  Besides those characteristics 
embedded in the development phases, there are 
five overarching characteristics that help ensure 
GFAS is ready and capable of performing human 
spaceflight mission preparations 
The first of these characteristics is the 
classification of GFAS software.  Since GFAS 
software applications are used in the human 
spaceflight, GFAS must follow the elements of 
the Class A classification for NASA software 
according to NPR 7150.2B. The Class A 
classification is applicable to software systems 
and applications that are used to ensure safe and 
sustainable software for human rated space 
vehicles, during ground and flight operations.  
For GFAS, this represents all of the applications 
used to monitor, command and control the 
various elements of the flight hardware from 
initial power up at KSC through the completion 
of a launch, scrub recycle and recovery 
operations.  The classification is applicable to all 
1.5+ million lines of code, thousands of 
applications and displays across the ten GFAS 
subsystems. 
Another key characteristic is the embedding of 
system safety engineers into the design and 
implementation process.  The GFAS system 
safety engineers are tasked with ensuring that the 
subsystem software design is safe and reliable 
when used for its intended purpose. During the 
design and implementation of the flight 
programs, the flight system safety engineer is 
responsible for analyzing the overall subsystem 
design and the hardware component failures that 
can lead to subsystem level hazards. This is 
accomplished by performing a hazards analysis 
and a qualitative reliability analyses, or failure 
modes and effects analysis upon the subsystem 
design.  If the analysis performed by the system 
safety engineer identifies concerns within the 
design, it is then the responsibility of the system 
safety engineer to raise the concerns through the 
flight system design review process.  The GFAS 
software safety engineers review the SRDS both 
at the Doc 45 and the Doc 90 reviews for 
incorporation of the flight system hazards 
through the proper implementation of the OMRS 
into the software applications.  Since the GFAS 
software is used to implement flight hardware 
activities and preparations for flight, many of the 
hazards and hazard analysis developed by the 
flight programs are translated into other 
operational requirements and are further 
implemented into the GFAS software code.  
Thus the system safety engineers who are 
assigned to the GFAS subsystem teams are 
focused on the proper implementation of those 
flight hardware hazards through the OMRS, the 
other operational requirements, into the software 
code. 
Another characteristic is the review and 
concurrence the safety engineers perform on the 
software code itself to ensure the software 
applications meet the software standards as 
defined.  These reviews ensure that applications 
for displays, command control sequences, 
prerequisite logic, reactive control logic, and 
data fusion are standardized.  In addition, the 
software chief engineer must concur with the 
application design through the approval of any 
deviation against the software application 
standards. 
Yet another overarching characteristic is the 
quality assurance effort required throughout the 
development process.  Quality engineering 
supports the Doc 45 and Doc 90 reviews and 
once baselined, using the SRDS and the RVTM, 
the Quality Engineer ensures through each step 
in the development that the software application 
meets the RVTM.  This is critical in the 
Integration, Verification and Validation steps in 
the development process.  It is also critical that 
any non-conformance is addressed against the 
software design requirements (SRDS) and 
traceable back to the RTVM.  
The final characteristic is the configuration 
control of the software application from its initial 
implementation through final validation and 
inclusion into the TCID used against flight 
hardware.  There is a rigorous process that aligns 
with the standards defined in NPR 7150.2B.  The 
GFAS team as a whole is accountable to 
configuration control of the software and the 
clear traceability from the requirements, through 
the implementation and into the verification and 
validation efforts.  Ultimately, at the Design 
Certification Review (DCR), the GFAS project 
attests to the completeness and readiness of the 
GFAS applications to perform their intended 
purpose against the flight and ground hardware.   
These five overarching characteristics are key to 
building a foundation of application software 
that will be safe to use against human rated flight 
hardware.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The ESD is in the midst of developing the first 
human rated beyond Earth space exploration 
capabilities in over 40 years.  The capabilities 
being developed will bring human crews further 
into the exploration of our solar system than ever 
before.  As the hardware and software 
capabilities are developed on the flight systems, 
a critical portion of the overall development is 
the design, development and implementation of 
ground applications to test, checkout, prepare 
and launch the flight systems.  The GFAS 
project is made up of ten software subsystems 
and is closely aligned, to the flight hardware and 
software systems.  The GFAS project follows a 
series of software requirements and standards.  
The implementation of these NASA Agency and 
GSDO Program requirements and standards is 
completed through a set of GFAS software 
safety characteristics to ensure safe and effective 
software applications. As the missions are 
designed, it is the solid safety approaches that 
will ensure the inherently risky missions can be 
successfully carried out for human exploration of 
our near space neighborhood.  
 
 
Image - 1 
REFERENCE 
[1]  2014, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, NASA Software Engineering 
Requirements, NASA NPR 7150.2 
 
[2] 2015, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Ground Systems Development 
And Operations Program, End To End Command 
And Control Software Development Plan, 
Volume 1, K000064476-PLN Rev: B 
 
[3] 2016, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Ground Systems Development 
And Operations Program, End to End 
GSE/GFAST Subsystem Implementation 
Standards, K0000254500- GEN 
 
[4] 2014, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Ground Systems Development 
And Operations Program, End-To-End 
Command and Control System and Software 
Safety Plan,  C3R-E2ECC-303 Rev: A 
 
[5] 2015, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Ground Systems Development 
And Operations Program, End-To-End 
Command and Control System Software 
Assurance Plan, K0000136629-PLN Rev: C 
 
IMAGE 
 
[1]  2016, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Space Launch System First 
Flight 
 
 
